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fines generally may be imposed up to SR 1,000,000, and prison sentences may
extend for as long as ten years for each offense.58
The Old Antibribery Law remained in effect without change for nearly thirty
years until August 1991 when it was amended by resolution of the Council of
Ministers to provide for sanctions against domestic and foreign entities whose
employees are charged with bribery if the offense was committed for the account
or benefit of the entity.59 Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. 17, the Old
Antibribery Law had provided for sanctions solely against individuals engaged
in proscribed conduct. Resolution No. 17 provided for the imposition of a fine
against violating entities not to exceed ten times the value of the bribe and/or
the banning of such company from participating in supply and public works
contracts with the government and public corporations for not less than five years.
The New Antibribery Law incorporates the amendments introduced by Resolution
No. 17.
Sweden*
On July 1, 1993, new legislation in the competition area became effective in
Sweden. The new legislation, succinctly called the Swedish Competition Act (the
Act), closely follows EC law, most notably articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of
Rome.' Sweden is, of course, not a member of the EC, but the Swedish legislature
has nevertheless opted to follow the EC rules and thereby conform Swedish law
in the area to that of most of Western Europe.2 Indeed, the Act may give Sweden
national competition legislation that is closer to the EC supranational rules than
that of any existing EC Member State.
58. New Antibribery Law, supra note 53, arts. 1-3, 5, 7, 9. Lesser sentences are specified for
violations by public employees who act or refuse to act in their official capacity at the request or
recommendation of a third party, rather than in exchange for monetary or other gain. Id. art. 4.
59. Council of Ministers Resolution No. 17 dated 16/2/1412 A.H. (corresponding to August
26, 1991), published in Umm Al Qura, issue no. 3373, dated 12/3/1412 A.H. (corresponding to
September 20, 1991) [hereinafter Resolution No. 17]. Resolution No. 17 also amended the Regulations
to Combat Forgery issued under Royal Decree No. 114 dated 26/11/1380 A.H. (corresponding to
May 11, 1961) to provide for sanctions against foreign or domestic entities whose employees are
convicted of forgery.
*Prepared by Stefan L. Moller, attorney at law, Gothenburg, Sweden. Mr. Moller earned his
LL.M. (Comparative and International Law) from SMU in 1984 and his J.D. in 1986.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
2. Sweden has applied for accession to the European Union, and the Agreement on a European
Economic Area, which came into effect on January 1, 1994, and which Sweden has signed, requires
its members to accept the EC competition rules.
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The Act also represents a fundamental change in the Swedish judicial approach
to the regulation of anticompetitive practices. Under the old law, i.e., pre-July
1, activities that might restrict competition were generally allowed, unless, under
a broadly worded clause, they were actually found to be anticompetitive. Thus,
while the old system allowed for intervention against many types of anticompeti-
tive activities, it was limited to intervention against individual cases of abusive
behavior. The new legislation, on the other hand, like its EC equivalent, only
applies to certain behavior, but it prohibits such behavior and declares it null
and void without any examination or decision in the individual case.3
I. Operative Provisions
The operative provisions of the Act consist of three main parts: (1) a prohibition
against concerted action that adversely affects competition; (2) rules against abuse
of a dominant position; and (3) merger control rules.
A. CONCERTED ACTION RESTRICTIVE OF COMPETITION
The Act's provisions against agreements restrictive of competition are, with
a few adjustments due primarily to the Act's status as Swedish national legislation4
and to incorporating established EC practice, a virtual translation of article 85
of the Treaty of Rome. Thus, section 6(1) of the Act prohibits agreements between
undertakings that have as their object or effect to prevent, restrict, or distort
competition in the Swedish market to an appreciable extent.
Section 6, like other provisions of the Act, is intended to be interpreted in
accordance with EC law. Accordingly, the term "undertaking" includes any
"natural or legal person engaged in activities of an economic or commercial
nature," a very broad definition.5 The nationality or location of the undertaking
or its owners is irrelevant.6 Similarly, the term "agreements" also has the same
broad meaning as under EC law. For example, traditional civil law requirements
for a contract need not be satisfied and a legally nonbinding, so-called gentlemen's
agreement qualifies. Indeed, even a unilateral and voluntary action by an undertak-
ing that limits its freedom of action towards another may qualify as an agreement
provided that there is some form of understanding or concert. On the other hand,
if no such concert exists, the unilateral actions of an undertaking, no matter how
3. Transitional provisions enabled undertakings, within six months of the effective date of the
Act, to (1) apply for an exemption or a negative clearance (discussed below), (2) alter the prohibited
agreement, or (3) terminate the agreement.
4. For example, unlike article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, no effect on interstate
trade is necessary.
5. Swedish Competition Act § 3(1).
6. An agreement's effect in Sweden provides jurisdiction under the Act. Thus, even if an
agreement is entered into abroad by foreign parties, the Act applies if competition within Sweden
is affected.
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anticompetitive, fall under the scope of the Act only if the undertaking has a
dominant position on the market in question.7
The term "agreement" finally also includes "concerted practices" between
undertakings, a more informal form of collusion aimed at situations where no
formal agreement can be found or proved, but a coordinated behavior can be
identified. Experiences from the EC show that it is often very difficult to distin-
guish between concerted action, which may be prohibited, and parallel action,
which the law allows. The distinction will turn on evidence, that is, who has the
burden of proof and by what weight it must be proven. Guidance may, as usual,
be found in EC case law.'
1. Exclusion of Certain Agreements
Because certain areas are subject to special regulation in Sweden and because
the concept of concerted action implies the involvement of at least two parties,
certain types of agreements are expressly or impliedly excluded from the Act.
First, the Act expressly excludes agreements between employers and employees
concerning wages and other conditions of employment. 9 Second, principals and
agents are viewed as one economic entity; consequently agreements between
them are not "agreements" under the Act. Third, related undertakings, such as
parents and subsidiaries ° are also deemed to form an economic unit, and
agreements between them, at least when the agreements relate to the internal
division of labor and the subsidiary has no real freedom to act independently,
are normally not considered restrictive of competition. The Act does not specify
what level of ownership is necessary" or how independent a subsidiary may be,
and EC competition law provides no clear answer. Legislative history does,
however, indicate that the Swedish lawmakers only intended the exception to
7. The definition of an "agreement" also includes "decisions by an association of undertak-
ings." Swedish Competition Act § 3(3)(1). Such decisions need not be binding on the association's
members to constitute an "agreement," making recommended or suggested retail price lists issued
by, for example, trade associations subject to the Act.
8. The area is, however, not very developed under EC law. It is settled that the plaintiff has
the primary burden of proving the existence of a concerted practice, but it is less clear by what
standard that burden must be discharged. For example, recent decisions in the EC seem to place a
fairly light burden of proof on the plaintiff. See, eg, Joined Cases 29 & 30/83, Compagnie Royale
Asturienne des Mines S.A. and Rheinzink GmbH v. Commission, 1984 E.C.R. 1679, 1702, 1
C.M.L.R. 688 (1985), where the ECJ held that it is, under certain circumstances, enough for the
plaintiff to discharge its burden of proof by presenting a logical hypothesis (to the effect that a
concerted practice is at hand), and thereby shift the burden of proof to the defendant who must then
present proof of its innocence.
9. Swedish Competition Act § 2. In Sweden, these types of agreements are to a large extent
regulated by collective bargaining.
10. The same principle should also apply to agreements between sister companies.
11. Although not free from doubt, under EC law, ownership of less than 50% may conceivably
be enough, provided there is nevertheless effective control through shareholding, voting, or board
members. See Ivo VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANgOIS BELLIS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EEC 208,
at 27 (2d ed. 1990).
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include agreements that concern the internal allocation of tasks between related
undertakings. 2 Fourth, and finally, an agreement that results from government
compulsion also falls outside the scope of the Act.
2. Minor Agreements
Similar to the de minimis rule in EC law, 3 section 6 of the Act requires for
its application that the restriction on competition in Sweden be "appreciable."
A combination of the size of the undertakings and the market share of the products
involved determines whether the effect on competition is sufficiently appreciable.
Accordingly, agreements between small or medium-sized undertakings that in-
volve approximately 10 percent of the relevant product market may be regarded
as de minimis. A slightly higher market share is acceptable if the participants
are very small (annual turnovers of less than SKr 10 million [approximately $1.2
million]). Restrictive agreements involving large undertakings are unlikely to
benefit from the de minimis exception, regardless of the market share of the
products involved. Section 6 finally contains a nonexhaustive list of practices to
which the prohibition particularly applies, of which various forms of price fixing
and market division are the most significant.
3. Exemptions
The prohibition contained in section 6 of the Act is not absolute. First, the
Act authorizes the Swedish Competition Authority (the Competition Authority)
to exempt an otherwise prohibited agreement in individual cases, provided the
parties notify the Competition Authority and the agreement satisfies certain condi-
tions laid down in section 8 of the Act. 14 An individual exemption is valid for
a specified period and is, as a general rule, retroactively effective to validate the
agreement from the date of its execution. A rule that may have great practical
importance as an alternative to a formal grant of an exemption is that if the
Competition Authority does not object to an agreement within three months of
receipt of the notification, the law grants the agreement an exemption for five
years from the date of its execution.' 5
Second, to alleviate the burden on the Competition Authority and to promote
12. Similarly, EC law probably provides that if the agreement goes beyond the internal relation-
ship between related undertakings and involves, for example, obstacles to market entry by another
undertaking, the exemption does not apply. Id.
13. Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, 1986 O.J. (C 231) 2, replacing
the previous notice.
14. The four conditions, which must all be met before an exemption can be granted, are that
the agreement: (1) contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress; (2) allows consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits; (3) only
imposes on the undertakings concerned restrictions that are not indispensable to the attainment of
the beneficial results; and (4) does not afford the undertakings involved the possibility of eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
15. Swedish Competition Act § 13(1).
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legal certainty, section 17 empowers the government to issue "block exemp-
tions," that is, exemptions that apply to categories of agreements without any
notification. By early 1994, regulations concerning nine such categories of
agreements had been issued, including eight adopted from the EC system. 16 In-
deed, because the Swedish legislature has virtually incorporated the EC regula-
tions into Swedish law, EC interpretations and guidelines will be particularly
important in this area.
Finally, an undertaking that has any doubt as to the legality of an agreement
may as an alternative to an exemption seek a negative clearance. By issuing a
negative clearance, the Competition Authority declares that, on the basis of the
facts provided by the applicant or otherwise within the possession of the Competi-
tion Authority, an agreement or practice does not fall within the scope of section
6. " While a negative clearance binds the Competition Authority, it has only
probative value in a court of law.
B. ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION
Section 19 of the Act contains rules concerning abuse of a dominant position that
are very similar to equivalent provisions of the Treaty of Rome. 18 Accordingly, EC
case law and other interpretations will be important in this area.
With respect to what market share amounts to a dominant position, legislative
history to the Act provides that, as a general rule, a market share exceeding 65
percent almost always constitutes a dominant position, and 50 percent or more
creates a presumption of dominance. On the other side of the spectrum a market
share of less than 30 percent does not in itself indicate a dominant position. As
to market shares between 30 and 50 percent, factors such as financial strength,
superior technology, and obstacles to market entry will be important.
Finally, because section 19 applies to abusive behavior, it does not provide
for any possibilites of an exemption, whether individual or group.' 9
C. MERGER (OR FUSION) CONTROL
The Swedish merger control rules in effect prior to the Act were not considered
very effective, with the result that Sweden has large concentrations in a number
of industry sectors. To provide a more modern and efficient system, the Act,
16. The categories are: (1) exclusive distribution agreements, (2) exclusive purchasing
agreements, (3) patent license agreements, (4) motor vehicles distribution and servicing agreements,
(5) specialization agreements, (6) research and development agreements, (7) know-how licensing
agreements, (8) franchise agreements, and (9) agreements concerning chains of retailers (the only
non-EC category).
17. Swedish Competition Act § 20.
18. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 86.
19. It is, however, possible to obtain a negative clearance to the effect that a certain practice
does not fall under the prohibition of § 19. Swedish Competition Act § 20.
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again in basic accord with EC rules,20 contains a system of rules aimed at control
of concentrations of undertakings.2" The rules focus on acquisitions that either
create or strenghten a dominant position that has harmful effects on competition
in Sweden.22 The rules require notification of all mergers of a certain size and
empower the Stockholm City Court to prohibit harmful mergers. Thus, any acqui-
sition of an undertaking where the combined worldwide turnover of the partici-
pants in the preceding financial year exceeded SKr 4 billion (approximately $500
million) must be notified to the Competition Authority.23 If the buyer belongs
to a group of companies, the combined turnover of the entire group will constitute
the buyer's turnover for purposes of calculating the threshold amount. Upon
notification, the Competition Authority has thirty days to decide whether to initiate
a "special investigation" into the acquisition or to clear the acquisition. During
that period the parties to the acquisition may not proceeed. After initiating a
"special investigation," the Competition Authority has three months to bring
an action in the Stockholm City Court to have the acquisition prohibited. The
Stockholm City Court, in its turn, has six months to decide the case. The decision
of the Stockholm City Court may be appealed to the Market Court, which must
decide the case within three months.24 The decision renders an acquisition that
is finally prohibited null and void.
Finally, acquisitions effected on a Swedish or foreign stock exchange are ex-
empted to the extent that they may not be prohibited. Instead, in such acquisitions
the buyer may be ordered to dispose of the acquired assets.
II. Sanctions
Unlike the old law, sanctions under the Act are strictly civil; violating the Act
incurs no criminal penalties. Two general types of sanctions are available. First,
the Competition Authority may impose fines to enforce various parts of the Act.25
It may also petition the Stockholm City Court to impose a special "anticompetitive
behavior charge" on any undertaking that has intentionally or negligently violated
20. See Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations
between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395), 1990 O.J. (L 257) 13 (corrected version).
21. The Swedish merger rules are aimed at domestic control and will in principle not apply to
mergers large enough to be subjected to the EC merger control system.
22. The merger control rules apply to acquisitions or mergers of undertakings that carry on
business in Sweden. Swedish Competition Act § 4(1). Thus, acquisitions of undertakings that do
business outside Sweden only do not fall within the scope of the merger provisions of the Act,
regardless of whether the acquiring undertaking is Swedish or not.
23. Id. § 37. Compare the EC rules where notification is required when (1) the combined annual
turnover of the participants exceed ECU 5 billion and (2) the individual Communitywide turnover
of at least two of the undertakings concerned exceed ECU 250 million. Thus, unlike the EC rules,
the Act does not allow a very large undertaking to acquire a small undertaking without notification.
24. Id. §§ 39(2), 42. During this time, that is, after the initial 30 days during which the parties
may explicitly not proceed with the acquisition and until the matter is finally decided, the Competition
Authority may petition the Stockholm City Court for an interim prohibition order. Id. § 41(1).
25. Id. § 57. No maximum is set for such fines.
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the prohibitions laid down in sections 6 or 19. That charge may be set at between
SKr 5,000 (approximately $600) and SKr 5 million (approximately $600,000)
or an amount in excess thereof, but not exceeding 10 percent of the undertaking's
annual turnover for the preceding financial year.2 6 Second, any agreement, or
part of an agreement if such part is severable, that violates the prohibition against
restriction of competition and any prohibited merger or aquisition is null and void.
Finally, parties and affected third-party undertakings may seek civil damages from
any undertaking that intentionally or negligently infringes the prohibitions of
sections 6 or 19. However, the general public, that is, consumers, are not entitled
to sue for damages under the Act.
III. Administration, Enforcement, and Appeals
The authority charged with the primary responsibility of enforcing and adminis-
tering the Act is a newly formed governmental authority, the Swedish Competition
Authority. The Competition Auhority may, as discussed above, seek and impose
fines to enforce its decisions under the Act as well as petition the Stockholm
City Court to impose substantial monetary penalties for violations of the Act. It
also has, similar to the European Commission, considerable fact-finding powers.
It may, under penalty of a fine, order the submission of documents and require
persons to appear at a hearing. It may also, with the permission of the Stockholm
City Court, conduct on-the-spot investigations of parties' and third parties' prem-
ises, where it may review documents, make copies, and conduct interviews.
Refusals to submit to such investigations may lead to fines. Indeed, the Competi-
tion Authority may be the kind of national competition authority that some EC
commentators suggest EC Member States need in order to improve the effective-
ness of the EC competition laws.27
Finally, and generally, appeals of decisions by the Competition Authority may
be made to the Stockholm City Court. Its decisions and judgments may be appealed
to the Market Court, the court of last resort.
IV. Conclusion
The Act is an interesting case of national legislative adoption of an existing
system of supranational rules. Such adoption may have advantages over newly
written legislation in terms of proven effectiveness and foreseeability, but there
may also be problems because rules created to govern one system may not in
all aspects be suited for another. For example, the Swedish national market is
26. Id. § 27. Note that, with respect to undertakings that are part of a group, unlike similar EC
provisions, the maximum charge is based on the targeted undertaking's individual turnover.
27. See, e.g., Alan J. Riley, More Radicalism, Please: The Notice on Co-operation between
National Courts and the Commission in Applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, 3 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 91 (1993).
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in many ways different from the European market in general, a fact that may
cause Swedish courts and authorities to apply certain provisions of the Act differ-
ently than would their EC counterparts. The Act also has a different and more
limited goal than its EC ecquivalent, which has as its broad and overriding goal
to further the integration of a single market. It is, therefore, probable that Swedish
application and interpretation will at least in some areas be less "political" and
use a different analysis. Indeed, while the legislature's clear intent is that the
Act be interpreted in accord with EC law, neither the Competition Authority nor
Swedish courts are bound by EC decisions or interpretations. Thus, time will
tell how closely Sweden will follow the rules after which its new legislation is
patterned. Without doubt, however, anything but a fairly close alignment will
to a great extent defeat the major purposes of the new law: to conform Swedish
law in the area to that of the rest of Western Europe and to subject Swedish and
other multinational companies operating in Sweden to one less set of rules.
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